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TVO-DIMENSIONAL DOCTRINE AND THREE-
DIMENSIONAL LAW: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR WEINSTEIN
Philip Hamburger*
Professor Weinstein examines how the IRB laws would fare under Su-
preme Court doctrine, and whereas it is my view that these laws should be
considered unconstitutional, he reaches largely the opposite conclusion.
His article therefore offers a valuable opportunity for further exploration of
the constitutional questions, and although there is not sufficient space here
to discuss all of his analysis, it seems important at least to draw attention to
the major points on which we take different perspectives.
MY POSITIONS
It is probably best to begin by clarifying my basic constitutional argu-
ments. I had obviously hoped to make my positions clear, but I may per-
haps have failed in this regard. Certainly, upon reading Professor
Weinstein's article, I cannot help thinking that one can never be clear
enough. Therefore, even if at the risk of repetition, it seems necessary to
draw attention to some of my positions.
First, rather than concern conduct, my argument is that the IRB laws
"target and even specify speech and the press as the object of their licens-
ing."' In Professor Weinstein's view, I take the position that the IRB laws
are regulations of conduct, and on this basis he answers that such regula-
tions are unlikely to be held unconstitutional.2 It may be that my argument
should centrally concern conduct, but this is not my focus. On the contrary,
Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 271,
281.
2 Incidentally, in pursuit of this point, Professor Weinstein quotes me that "although the IRB regula-
tions appear to be focused on conduct, they discriminate on the basis of content"--his implication being
that I share his view that the IRB laws are primarily regulations of conduct. James Weinstein, Institu-
tional Review Boards and the Constitution, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 493, 504-05 (2007) (citing Hamburger,
supra note 1, at 306). My next sentence, however, explains that the regulations which "appear" to be
focused on conduct are, in fact, regulations that "candidly require IRBs to license the verbal core of
speech and the press." Hamburger, supra note 1, at 306. The footnote elaborates that "the IRB regula-
tions expressly define 'research' in terms of speech and the press." Id. at 306 n.94.
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my argument emphasizes that the IRB laws "candidly require IRBs to li-
cense the verbal core of speech and the press."3
Second, far from relying exclusively on spending conditions, my ar-
gument is that the IRB laws have the full obligation of law. Professor
Weinstein is under a different impression and says I take the view that the
IRB laws are unconstitutional "even though" they "are not directly imposed
on research institutions by force of law but rather are adopted ... as a con-
dition on receiving federal research funds."4 In fact, although I discuss such
conditions and argue that they should be considered unconstitutional, my
argument concludes that the federal government now primarily relies on
state negligence law to give force to the IRB laws. In particular, the gov-
ernment used its conditions to establish IRBs as the standard of care for
conducting research, and having thus successfully "elevated IRBs as the
standard method of avoiding research injuries, it could rely on state tort law
to induce research institutions to use IRBs."5
Third, my argument rests on the concept of licensing rather than the
notion of prior restraint. Professor Weinstein assumes it is my view that the
IRB laws are unconstitutional as prior restraints. He thus says that my ar-
gument is "[s]pecifically . .. that these regulations constitute a content-
based prior restraint."6 This is the sort of analysis, however, that I specifi-
cally reject. Instead, my argument is that notwithstanding Supreme Court
doctrine on prior restraint, the core of the freedom of speech and the press
remains a freedom from licensing. On this basis, the IRB laws should be
considered unconstitutional because they "set up a system of licensing" and
"target and even specify speech and the press as the object of their licens-
ing."
7
In short, rather than rest on conduct, conditions, and prior restraint, my
argument actually ends up focusing on verbal language, the direct obliga-
tion of law, and licensing.
THE IRB LAWS
More significantly, the IRB laws themselves are a matter on which
there are different perspectives. It is especially important to examine these
differences, for an analysis of the IRB laws must rest on the reality of these
laws.
It is possible to take the view that the IRB laws concern conduct rather
than speech. Certainly, the IRB laws focus on "research," and Professor
Weinstein therefore assumes that the laws specify a sort of conduct. The
3 Hamburger, supra note 1, at 306.
4 Weinstein, supra note 2, at 493.
5 Hamburger, supra note 1, at 329.
6 Weinstein, supra note 2, at 493.
7 Hamburger, supra note 1, at 281.
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Common Rule, however, defines research in terms of verbal language-as a
"systematic investigation" in pursuit of "generalizable knowledge."8 This is
an allusion to scientific knowledge, and it expressly refers to such knowl-
edge as can be reduced to an hypotheses or general statement. Although
Professor Weinstein does not consider this a reference to speech or the
press, there are many reasons to understand it as such. Here, it should suf-
fice to observe that the government itself asks universities to acknowledge
that "generalizable knowledge" is that which is "expressed ... in theories,
principles, and statements of relationships."9  Moreover, a recent NIH
committee, the National Science Foundation, and most IRBs recognize that
a "systematic investigation" designed to develop "generalizable knowl-
edge" means what a researcher "plans to publish" and often what is "pub-
lishable."'" In these ways, the government and other participants in the
licensing system openly concede that the IRB laws license speech and the
press.
Professor Weinstein's distinctive understanding of the IRB laws also
becomes apparent when he argues that IRB laws lack legal obligation, for
he assumes they are imposed "through a condition on receipt of federal
support for research."" As already suggested, the federal government be-
gan by relying on conditions, but it systematically used its conditions to
elevate IRB licensing as the standard of care for human subjects research.
To be precise, it "employed unconstitutional conditions to ensure wide use
and acceptance" of IRB licensing, thus deliberately making IRB licensing
the standard of care for "liability under state tort law." 2 Negligence law is
therefore now the primary legal obligation behind the IRB laws, and far
from being a matter of dispute, this is widely recognized by universities.
Constitutional analysis can only be persuasive if it focuses on statutes,
regulations, and other laws as they actually exist. To be sure, on the sur-
face, the IRB laws use spending conditions to secure licensing of research,
8 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2005).
9 THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,193 (April 18, 1979).
The request that institutions acknowledge this appears in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FEDERALWIDE ASSURANCE (FWA) FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS FOR INSTITUTIONS
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2006), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/assurance/
filasur.rtf.
10 For the Committee and the IRBs, see COMM. ON THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BDS. IN
HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH DATA PRIVACY PROT., DIV. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED.,
PROTECTING DATA PRIVACY IN HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 53 (2000). The National Science Foun-
dation says that research "includes activities, which are intended to lead to published results, or for ex-
ample, findings presented at a professional meeting." National Science Foundation, Frequently Asked
Questions and Vignettes, http://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/hsfaqs.jsp (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
11 Weinstein, supra note 2, at 550.
12 Hamburger, supra note 1, at 331. Of course, there are also state IRB laws, but negligence law is
more significant.
101:563 (2007)
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and this would be bad enough. The reality, however, is that the government
also uses the obligation of negligence law to secure licensing of what is
"expressed" and designed to be "publish[ed]," and if the government and
many of those who enforce its licensing admit as much, then so should the
academics who study the constitutionality of the licensing.
THE DIMENSIONS OF LAW
Underlying these different perceptions is a deeper problem-a style of
analysis in which three-dimensional law gets reduced to doctrine as flat as
the pages of Supreme Court opinions. Professor Weinstein argues as if the
debate here concerns the constitutionality of the IRB laws under the doc-
trines enunciated by the Supreme Court. As it happens, the IRB laws are
probably unconstitutional under the Court's doctrines, but this is almost be-
side the point, for the central question, which must precede any application
of doctrine, is the plausibility of the Court's doctrines as applied to the core
freedom from licensing.
Americans once enjoyed the benefit of an absolute prohibition against
laws requiring the licensing of speech and the press, but in the twentieth
century this old freedom of speech and the press came to be submerged un-
der newer doctrines. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court developed doc-
trines on spending and prior restraint that gave the impression that the
federal government could impose licensing of speech or the press as long as
it did so through conditions on expenditures or with a strong government
interest. The Court's doctrines thus simultaneously emboldened the gov-
ernment to think that it could impose the licensing and deprived academics
of any confidence they had a constitutional ground to object. 3 This was the
constitutional disaster that gave rise to the IRB laws, and therefore the cen-
tral question is not whether the IRBs are constitutional under the Court's
doctrines, but rather whether these doctrines should be understood to oblit-
erate the old, absolute freedom from licensing. The Court's doctrines cre-
ated an opening for the government to impose licensing of speech and the
press, and once it is recognized that the Court bears responsibility for the
censorship, it becomes evident that the Court has a duty to restore the con-
stitutional obstacles against it.
In the end, both IRBs and the Constitution deserve a deeper analysis
than can be found on the mere surface of Supreme Court opinions. Even
the best constructed judicial doctrine is little more than an attempt to sum-
marize, on a two-dimensional page, a law that must exist in the full three-
dimensions of life, and it therefore cannot be assumed that the surface of the
prose is a complete account of the ideas that lie below. With respect to
spending and prior restraint, moreover, the Court's doctrines are not at all
well constructed. On the contrary, these doctrines have given legitimacy to
13 Id. at 277-81,351-54.
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three decades of licensing, and thus, as I have written before, "[r]esearchers
who oppose IRBs face many difficulties, but none more debilitating than
the doctrines of the Supreme Court, for those doctrines give the impression
that researchers are without a plausible constitutional claim." 4 The threat
to liberty comes from the Court's irresponsible creation of doctrines that in-
vite censorship, and this threat is all the greater because of the tendency of
commentators to accept the thinnest surface of doctrine as if it were the en-
tirety of the law. What is therefore needed is not an application of two-
dimensional doctrines-let alone merely the top surface of such doctrines-
but rather, more substantially, an understanding of the three-dimensional
law that still can be discerned beneath.
14 Id. at 353.
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